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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details  
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 767 
Accident time: 08:20 Accident Date: 01/07/2010 




Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: None 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: rocks/stones 
steep slope 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
Two records of this accident have been sourced, edited for anonymity and reproduced below. 
The first is the UNMACCA Board of Inquiry report, the second is the Lessons Learned 




[Undated: Date of accident is taken from the Lesson’s Learned document appended.] 
BOARD OF INQUIRY ABOUT FATAL DEMINING ACCIDENT of [Victim No.1] the team 
leader of [Demining group] MU-07 and injuries to [Victim No.2], the deminer of the same 
team. 
INTRODUCTION 
[Name removed], Deputy Director for the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan 
(MACCA) convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to investigate the circumstances involved 
in the demining accident causing the death of [Victim No.1] the Team Leader of [Demining 
group] MU-07 and injured [Victim No.2] a deminer of the same team. 
The BOI comprised the following personnel: 
Dr. [Name removed], Chairman 
Mr. [Name removed] DMC,Member 
[Name removed]/AMAC Charikar, Member 
[Demining group] Representative, Facilitator Observer 
A copy of the appointment of personnel to carry out this formal investigation including the BOI 
Terms of Reference is at Annex A to this report. 
GEOGRAPHY AND WEATHER 
Salang district of Parwan province is located on the main highway from Kabul to the Northern 
provinces of Afghanistan. It is a mountainous area of the Hindu Kush series of mountains, 
which are very cold in winter and spring. Therefore demining operations can be conducted 
there only during the summer time. Salang valley is surrounded by steep sloping mountains 
especially on both sides of the main road.  
Priority of Task 
Minefield number [Demining group]-1950 is located in a close vicinity of Kabul Mazar highway 
in the Paja bridge area of Salang district, Parwan province. Russian forces planted POMZ, 
OZM-72 and PMN anti-personnel mines there in 1981 to block any attacks from their 
opposition on their convoys. After the war period and when the internal conflict finished, the 
local people returned to their villages these mines were left and have caused some accidents. 
As the main highway passes through this area and thousands of people are using it on daily 
basis, it is counted as a potential risk to those who stops there during their travel. Also lots of 
people are going to Salang district to have a traditional mulberry picnic and the presence of 
mines is a potential risk for them, so the area has a high priority for clearance.  
SITE LAYOUT AND MARKING 
MF [Demining group] 1950 located on a steep sloping area, the site layout and marking were 
as per AMAS and [Demining group] SOPs. The team was really conducting a difficult job, they 
were using ropes to tie themselves during the operations in order not to dropdown from their 
clearance lanes. Cleared and hazard areas were easily distinguishable due to marking.   
MANAGEMENT, SUPERVISION AND DISCIPLINE ON SITE 
Although it was said by [Demining group] that they were happy with the deceased team 
leader in terms of his ability to command, control and maintain discipline onsite. External QA 
personnel also confirmed that [Victim No.1] was a good team leader. But this is the 2nd fatal 
accident of team leaders having the same scenario of handling POMZ mines after being 
discovered by deminers. BOI team asked the [Demining group] operations representative 
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about the case of handling discovered mines, if there is any directives from operations that 
the team leaders should further investigate any discovered mine. The representative of 
[Demining group] said that after the first fatal accident occurred last year, we have informed 
all our team leaders not to further investigate such mines, they should only prepare the 
shaped charge and immediately destroy them after being found/ discovered.  
It was the fault of team leader himself that he ordered deminer after he found a POMZ mine to 
leave the lane and start the new one. The team leader then started further investigation on it 
and caused it to go off and resulting in a fatal accident. [Demining group] assigned one 
supervisors for four sites there in the Salang distinct to conduct periodic supervision. This 
would normally be enough had the risks not been as high there, But in high risk areas such as 
in Salang district, if the number supervisors are increased to one supervisor for two sites this 
will improve the safety and operations.  
QUALITY ASSURANCE AND QUALITY CONTROL 
In addition to [Demining group] internal QA visits, the team was visited by MACCA external 
QA on 20 May 2010, the result was good. But one visit per two months is not enough in such 
a high risk area, therefore, the quality and frequency of the QA visits should be increased 
both internal and external.  
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTING 
There is no problem in communication and reporting system.   
MEDICAL REPORTS 
The accident happened on 08:20 and paramedic reached the accident site in 5 minutes, but 
due to the severity of injuries the victim passed away on the spot. The paramedic then moved 
to help the injured deminer and the evacuation took place at 09:00am. The ambulance was 
available and the CASEVAC drill was conducted one day before this accident happened.    
WITNESS INTERVIEWS AND STATEMENTS 
The supervisor and senior medic were interviewed by the BOI team. The statements are 
attached at Annex C to this report.   
DETAILS OF THE MINE INVOLVED 
Salang district is mainly contaminated with PMN, POMZ and OZM-72. All of them are old 
mines laid by Russian forces which are displaced by seasonal floods and became very 
sensitive.    
EVIDENCE OF RE-MINING 
The BOI found no evidence of re-mining of the clearance site and this therefore did not 
contribute to the accident. 
EVIDENCE OF SITE INTERFERENCE OR TAMPERING AFTER THE ACCIDENT 
No evidences of site tempering were seen.    
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
All the team members were issued with a set of personal protective equipment including 
visors. But most probably the team leader died because of the head trauma (secondary 
trauma), as he was thrown back by explosion to a rocky area and got severe trauma on the 
backside of his skull (Occipital bone).  
USE OF MINE DETECTION DOGS (MDD) 
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[Demining group] does not use MDDs in their operations.     
USE OF Mechanical MACHINES (MDU) 
The MDU was not used in this site as it was mountainous area with a steep sloping terrain. 
DATE OF LAST REVISION COURSE FOR TEAM INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT 
According to [Demining group] training policy, all the teams should undergo a detailed training 
after their winter leave. So, all the [Demining group] teams including MU-07 received detailed 
training during the month of February 2010.  
DETAILS OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND TREATMENT 
The accident occurred on 08:20, the paramedic arrived to the accident site on 08:25, but the 
team leader had lost his life on the spot. He started first aid application to the injured deminer, 
stabilized the deminer and stopping any bleeding, he applied a iv infusion and evacuated the 
dead body and injured deminer on 09:00, 40 minutes after the accident happened.  
PARTICULARS OF DEMINERS INSURANCE 
The victims were covered for death and trauma insurance under a [Demining group] standard 
policy. 
DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE ACTIVITIES ON THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT 
The team started operations on 05:30 at the morning, everyone received briefing from the 
team leader. MU-07 was implementing a regime of 30 minutes work and 10 minutes break in 
this area, as it is a difficult and steep sloping task. It was 08:15 that the deminer [Victim No.2] 
detected a signal in his clearance lane and then identified that it was a POMZ mine after 
discovering a part of it. He called his team leader that he has found a POMZ mine and 
partially discovered it.  
The mine was not in its normal position; it was fallen down to the ground probably caused by 
seasonal floods and was surrounded by small rocks. The team leader instructed deminer to 
leave the clearance lane and wait in a safe/cleared area. Then the team leader started further 
investigation without tying himself with a rope as the deminers were doing such during the 
operation.  
During the investigation, he initiated the mine, causing it to detonate and the accident 
happened. The team leader was in a semi sitting position, he was wearing his PPE correctly. 
However the fragments of mine caused multiple injuries to his arm and knee joint and had 
thrown him backward. As the area was steep sloping, he had fallen down about three meters 
to a rocky portion of the ground. The backside of his head hit on a rock and caused severe 
head trauma, this is deemed to be the cause of death.  
Some fragments caused non severe injuries to the deminer [Victim No.2] who was waiting in 
a safe/cleared area.   
TECHNICAL POINTS CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT 
The accident happened because of the carelessness of team leader, he could easily have 
prepared a shaped charge and destroyed the mine immediately. But he started further 
investigation on a highly sensitive POMZ mine without having any reason for it.  He was well 
aware of the fatal accident happened last year on a team leader conducting the same 
investigation on a POMZ mine.   
SUMMARY 
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It is the view of the BOI team that the team leader conducted un-necessary investigation on a 
found, identified and highly sensitive POMZ mine. He initiated the mine and caused it to go off 
which resulted in fatal accident. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the BOI conclusion that the team leader, [Victim No.1] made the mistake in terms of 
conducting un-necessary investigation on a found and identified POMZ mine, while he could 
simply destroy the mine with a shaped charge.   
RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT REOCCURRENCE 
The BOI recommend the following points in relation to this accident:  
[Demining group] operations department is recommended to issue written directive stating 
that no further investigation is to be conducted on found identified mines. Any further 
investigations shall be stopped in such cases and the mine shall be destroyed in situ 
immediately after finding.  
The level of supervision should be strengthened by assigning one supervisor for each two 
teams in Salang area.  
More internal and external QA visits should be conducted on the teams working in high risk 
areas such as in Salang district.    
[Demining group] should take necessary actions, considering the recommendations of BOI 
team and inform MACCA Programme Director by no later than the 31st July 2010.  
Signed: Dr. [Name removed], BOI Chairman 
ANNEXES: [Not made available] 
Annex A: BOI - Terms of Reference 
Annex B: Victim photos 
Annex C: Accident site photos 
Annex D: Witness Interviews and Statements 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
[Name removed], Deputy Director for the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan 
(MACCA) convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) team to investigate the circumstances involved 
in the demining accident causing the death of [Victim No.1] the Team Leader of [Demining 
group] MU-07 and injured [Victim No.2] a deminer of the same team on 01 July 2010 in Paja 
village, Salang district of Parwan province. 
SUMMARY 
Minefield number [Demining group]-1950 is located in a close vicinity of Kabul Mazar highway 
in the Paja bridge area of Salang district, Parwan province. Russian forces planted POMZ, 
OZM-72 and PMN anti-personnel mines there in 1981 to block any attacks from their 
opposition on their convoys. After the war period and when the internal conflict finished, the 
local people returned to their villages these mines were left and have caused some accidents. 
As the main highway passes through this area and thousands of people are using it on daily 
basis, it is counted as a potential risk to those who stops there during their travel. Also lots of 
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people are going to Salang district to have a traditional mulberry picnic and the presence of 
mines is a potential risk for them, so the area has a high priority for clearance.  
On 01 July 2010 the deminer [Victim No.2] found a POMZ mine in his clearance lane, he 
informed team leader, the team leader ordered [Victim No.2] to leave the lane and start the 
new one. The team leader then started further investigation on it and caused it to go off and 
resulted in fatal accident to him and some minor injuries to the deminer [Victim No.2]. 
CONCLUSION 
This is the 2nd fatal accident of [Demining group] team leaders having the same scenario of 
handling POMZ mines after being discovered by deminers. Therefore, it is counted as 
carelessness of team leader. 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
The BOI recommend the following points in relation to this accident:  
• [Demining group] operations department is recommended to issue written directive 
stating that no further investigation is to be conducted on found identified mines. Any 
further investigations shall be stopped in such cases and the mine shall be destroyed 
in situ immediately after finding.  
• The level of supervision should be strengthened by assigning one supervisor for each 
two teams in Salang area.  
• The command group of all demining teams should strongly consider the sensitivity 
and risk of such mines and do not temper them after being found and investigated, a 
charge should prepared for the destruction of such mines. 
• More internal and external QA visits should be conducted on the teams working in 
high risk areas such as in Salang district.    
• [Demining group] should take necessary actions, considering the recommendations 




Victim number: 952 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Arms; severe Head; severe Legs 
FATAL 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. Fragmentation and fall injuries. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 953 Name: [Name removed] 
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Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron; Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "Non-severe" fragmentation injuries. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate training because Victim No.1 was a 
Field Supervisor who did not work to the group’s SOPs. The secondary cause is listed as a 
Management Control Inadequacy because the group’s management was responsible for 
appointing, training and monitoring its field supervisors. The failure to provide appropriate 
numbers of field supervisors (noted by the investigators) was a further Management Control 
Inadequacy. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of details such as the 
time taken for Victim No.2 to arrive at hospital and the injuries her suffered.  
The accident is unusual because of the steep terrain being worked on. Deminers were roped 
to prevent falls but the supervisor did not take this precaution. He apparently died as a result 
of falling three metres and landing on his head in rocks. 
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